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Abstract 
The main purpose of this theoretical study is to analyzes whether commercialization of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) is responsible for over-indebting their poor borrowers taking into account the recent Andhra Pradesh (AP) 
incidence. Critics argue that massive influx of commercial capital cause exponential growth of loan portfolios of 
the MFIs that finally cause over-indebtedness. The diagnosis of AP incidence indicates that commercialization is 
not solely and directly responsible for over-indebting their clients. It is the outcome of internal inefficiencies, 
unethical operations and malpractices of MFIs. However, commercialization is indirectly responsible for over-
indebtedness when ‘profit seeking’ MFIs start unethical practices to maximize their profit. This issue is 
important not only for India but also in some other developing countries to ensure sustainability of MFIs and to 
protect their poor clients.  
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1. Introduction 
Immense public recognition of microfinance for its social orientation and fighting against poverty is now facing 
increasing criticism and public attention due to its allegation of exploiting and over-indebting its clients. The 
benefit of microfinance is now an illusion. M. Yunus’s (2006) claim of microcredit as human right1 is now in 
question especially after the 2010 Andhra Pradesh over-indebted microfinance borrowers’ suicides 2 . 
Commercialization of microfinance institutions (MFIs) are sometimes alleged for over-indebting their poor 
borrowers. Critics argue that massive influx of capital from shareholders, commercial banks, international and 
private investors cause exponential growth of loan portfolios of MFIs that finally push the whole sector as an 
ideal breeding ground of over-indebtedness (Taylor, 2011; Mader, 2013; Wichterisc, 2012). Trade liberalization, 
state retrenchment of formal banking sector, and agricultural transformation in India infused MFIs as a lucrative 
private sector offering high and attractive profit to investors. It endangers social impact and the industry 
sustainability (Hudon, 2009); cause exploitations, economic, social and psychological pressure to borrowers and 
results the worst scenario as claimed in media: suicide and prostitution (Guerin et al, 2009a; Mader, 2013; Taylor, 
2011).  
However, commercialization of microfinance is the strategy to accumulate funds when subsidy from donors and 
charities ceases to exist for a long time. But commercialization translated into deluge of funds for investment in 
MFIs, caused huge market penetration, market saturation, multiple lending and over lending; and finally, over-
indebting their clients. The crisis in Andhra Pradesh is the worst case of this allegation. It happened not only in 
India but also in many other developing countries of the world such as Bosnia, Herzegovina, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Bolivia and Nicaragua with different dimensions and experiences (Olteanu, 2011). But we cannot avoid 
commercialization in the absence of subsidy and donor support as investors will not provide funds without 
financial incentives. At this moment, it is important to justify whether commercialization of microfinance is 
responsible for their clients’ over-indebtedness and if so, to what extent and in what way it is responsible; or 
whether it is the outcome of unethical practices of MFIs or some other factors rather than commercialization. 
This theoretical study tries to find out the answer of these questions. 
The main objective of this paper is to study whether commercialization of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is 
responsible for over-indebting their poor borrowers taking into account the Andhra Pradesh crisis. The main 
research questions are: whether over-indebtedness is the outcome of unethical and malpractice of profit hunger 
                                                           
1 Speech at the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony at Oslo, Norway: he mentioned microfinance as the tool to establish peace by 
fighting against poverty and treated microcredit as human right. Source: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html (Date: December 10, 2006). 
2 See Yoolim Lee & Ruth David: Suicides in India Revealing How Men Made a Mess of Microcredit. Bloomberg Market 
Magazine (December 28, 2010) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-28/suicides-among-borrowers-in-india-show-
how-men-made-a-mess-of-microcredit.html 
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commercialized microfinance institutions? What is the extent of this conviction? Or is it the outcome of some 
other factors? What counter-mechanism and policy implications are necessary to overcome this crisis? Result of 
the Andhra Pradesh diagnosis indicates that commercialization is not solely and directly responsible for over-
indebting their clients. It is the outcome of internal inefficiencies and unethical practices of MFIs and some other 
external factors. The analysis, however, indicates that commercialization is indirectly responsible for over-
indebtedness when commercial investments in these ‘profit seeking’, MFIs caused huge market penetration, 
multiple lending and over lending through some unethical practices.  
I presented the rest of this paper as follow: section two is theoretical background and literature review, section 
three is the diagnosis of Andhra Pradesh crisis, section four is the discussion and justification whether 
commercialization is responsible or not, section five discusses management consequences, section six is the 
recommendation, policy implications and limitations and finally section seven is conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
Commercialization generally means the MFI’s seeking to operate with commercial sources of funding following 
market based business principles and without direct or indirect subsidy elements in its funding structure 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). It indicates leveraging interest revenues, mobilizing savings deposits1 and the 
ability of the MFIs to distribute profits to their shareholders that helps the MFIs to access vast pool of capital. 
Armendariz and Morduch (2010) treated commercialization as a ‘win-win’ situation by adopting commercial 
principles and practices in fighting against poverty. However, seeking profit by serving the poor in this way has 
fear of ‘mission drift’ due to the trade-off between profitability and outreach to the poor (Morduch, 2000; 
Armendariz and Szafarz, 2011). The background of the spirit of commercialization approach of MFIs is on Max 
Weber’s proposition of ‘ethics of responsibility’, where as, M. Younus and many other critics’ view 
commercialization as the ‘ethics of conviction’ (Schmidth, 2012). The first one is the urgency of microfinance 
institutions for its sustainability and social orientation. The evil side is when MFIs commercialization is alleged 
for ‘ethics of conviction’.  
Over-indebtedness is the outcome of the ‘ethics of conviction’ of MFIs (Schmidth, 2012). Canner and Luckett 
(1991) treat over-indebtedness when the debt problems are structural and persistent over a certain time horizon. 
Oiko Credit defines over-indebtedness when a client cannot repay the loan more than three months (Gravestijn et 
al, 2011). Schicks (2013) defines over-indebtedness from client sacrifice perspective when a customer 
continuously struggle to meet repayment deadlines and has to make undue sacrifice related to his/her loan 
obligations that has more than transitory effects. Some researchers and practitioners measure it as the net 
indebtedness index 2  (Betti et al., 2007), debt service ratio (Collins 2008), legally bankrupt borrowers or 
delinquency/default/arrear ratio (Disney et al, 2008; Kappel et al., 2010); others measure it as the perception of 
debt burden (Lea et al, 1993; Guerin et al, 2009b). However, according to Guerin et al. (2009b) the consideration 
of only default or debt burden is not suitable to measure over-indebtedness in developing countries. It can result 
in either inability to repay or unwillingness and costly actins required to repay (Gonzalez, 2008; Schicks, 2013). 
However, these definitions and measurements exclude those borrowers who do repay their loans by making 
strategic sacrifice or assisted by family members to repay their loan (Gravestijn et al, 2011). It also excludes the 
borrowers who strategically default or deliberately accumulate unsustainable amount of debt (Schicks, 2013).  
The causes, factors behind and consequences of commercialization of microfinance are discussed by Babri et al. 
(2010), Carrilo (2009), Chasmar (2009) and Schmidth (2012). Sriram (2010a) discussed commercialization of 
microfinance from Indian context. The literature on Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis, extent of microfinance 
commercialization, clients’ over-indebtedness, factors and causes related to over-indebtedness in India till to date 
are Reddy (2010), Mader (2013), Kumar (2012), Wichterich (2012), Arunachalam (2011), Schmidt (2010), Nair 
(2011), Taylor (2011), Ghate (2007b), Picherit (2009), Guerin et al. (2009a) and Joseph (2012). The other 
studies on over-indebtedness in other parts of the world are: Morvant-Roux (2009) on Mexico; Olteanu (2011) 
on Peru; Burki (2009) on Panjab province in Pakistan; Pytkowska and Spannuth (2011) on Kosovo; Maurer and 
Pytkowska (2011) on Bosnia and Herzegovina; Schicks (2013) on Ghana; Khalily and Faridi (2011) on 
Bangladesh; Rhyne (2001), Vogelgesang (2003), Gonzalez (2008), Gonzalez-Vega and Villafani-Ibarnegaray 
(2011) on Bolivia crisis 1999-2000, and Hurwitz and Luiz (2007) on South African context. The detail of the 
findings is not possible to discuss in this limited space. However, there is hardly any study found that empirically 
and theoretically discussed whether commercialization of microfinance causes over-indebting their clients; 
majority of them indirectly claimed commercialization for this crisis. This paper is a step towards to explore this 
critical debate. 
 
                                                           
1 If regulation in the country permits savings 
2 debt service payment in relation to net income 
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3. A Diagnosis of the Commercialization and Microfinance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh 
The recent example of microfinance commercialization is Andhra Pradesh, a southern state of India. 
Microfinance operation in this ‘hub’ began in 1980s in small scale as NGO driven MFIs. But due to the state 
drive as the ‘priority sector’ and the World Bank funding in 1990s, it underwent expansion and 
commercialization (Taylor, 2011). Trade liberalization, state retrenchment of formal banking sector and 
transformation in the agricultural sector facilitate livelihood diversification. It bolstered MFIs as the new breed 
of private sector offering attractive profit to investors. Massive influx of capital from shareholders, commercial 
banks, and international and private investors cause exponential growth of loan portfolios of MFIs that finally 
push the whole state as an ideal breeding ground of debt dependency and over-indebtedness of the poor 
households (Mader, 2013; Taylor, 2011). 
3. 1. Krishna District: The First Warning of the Crisis 
The first warning of the crisis was in 2006 at Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh. It started by borrowers’ 
demonstration to back (return) their house title (deed) that had been seized as collateral and it turned into violent 
protest. At that time MFIs were alleged for 200 suicides and repayment rate went down around 10% to 20% for 
several months (Ghate, 2006 & 2007a; Sharma, 2006). As a consequence, the state government temporarily 
closed 50 MFI offices of Spandana Spoorthy and SHARE Microfinance (Mader, 2013). However, these MFIs 
have denied their allegation of wrong doing; rather claimed that state lending program, Self Help Group (SHG) 
has acted as enabling factor in the crisis (Mader, 2013; Ghate, 2007b). 
3. 2. The Microfinance Bubble  
In India, during 1990s, thousands of microfinance institutions and non-banking finance companies acted as 
intermediaries between the women borrowers at marginal level and the commercial banks. They took loan from 
Indian and foreign banks at usual interest rate to bolster their capital and guarantee liquidity; then re-lend it to 
poor women and households at usurious interest rates and charges (Wichterich, 2012). Turning this credit-
lending process into market mechanized profit making sector, MFIs have established as an attractive sector of 
handsome return from investment (Mader, 2013). The number of MFIs soared to above 3,000 within a decade 
(Wichtrich, 2012). After the Krishna incidence, rather than halting the inflow of capital, the trend continued for 
its typical prospects of attractive return. The investment funds (MIVs) geared this fastest growing segment 
articulated by penetration into financially excluded segment of Indian population that was impressed for high 
rate of repayments and widespread outreach, gender equality and articulated success stories. The promise of 
double digit return on their investment, widespread belief of microcredit as the panacea to reduce poverty, 
empowering women, and promoting small entrepreneurship fulfilled the bankers’ and investors’ need to make 
attractive profit with social orientation (Taylor, 2011; Wichterich, 2012; Mader, 2013).  
In this microfinance investment mania, equity infusion drove a rapid growth in lending; six leading MFIs 
attracted 80% of investment and it caused an annual portfolio growth of 89% between March 2006 and March 
2010 (Mader, 2013). The commercial injection of investment changed a herd of highly ambitious ‘young turk’ 
(Greenfield) MFIs, which were making losses, surprisingly become profitable (Parameshwar et al., 2010; Mader, 
2013). In 2007-2008, SKS, the largest MFI in India, rose net profit by 700% and the second largest MFI, 
Spandana Spoorthy, increased net profit by 1,700% (Nair, 2010; Wichterich, 2012). In 2008-2009, they 
confirmed increase of 60% clients from previous year, reached 8.5 million female clients with approximately 8 
billion US dollar (360 billion rupees) loan portfolios (Srinivasan, 2010; Wichterich, 2012). The immense loan 
factory in Andhra Pradesh accounted just around 30% of India’s total loan portfolio despite only 7% of the total 
Indian population in that state (Srinivasan, 2010; Mader, 2013). The industry shown an immensely profitable 
sector with an average return on equity (ROE) of 27.5% in 2008 and 25% in 2009; the 10 largest MFIs even 
earned on average 37.8% and 35.2% in 2008 and 2009 respectively (Mader, 2013). This extraordinary return 
fueled private capital; loan portfolio stood around 2.7 billion US dollar among these six leading MFIs with an 
annual compound growth of 89% (Arunachalam, 2011; Mader, 2013). 
3. 3. SKS: The Lynchpin in the Bubble 
SKS was at the frontline of the Andhra Pradesh microfinance boom. SKS started its business in 1997 by Indian-
American ‘social entrepreneur’ Vikram Akula as a non-profit NGO, but transformed into Non-bank Finance 
Corporation (NBFC) in 2005. By 2007, it has become the largest profitable MFI in India (Mader, 2013). Due to 
its illusive growth and lucrative financial profit, Sequoia Capital, an American venture capital fund, invested in 
23.6% of its equity with the aim of ‘exit with profit’ through share issue in stock market (Mader, 2013). 
Commercial banks also took opportunity to lend them as a safe bet profitable ‘priority sector’1. A deal of 
                                                           
1 Please see Rediff Business. 2004. Banks take the hint, to step up farm loans. Rediff Business, Mumbai, May 28. Available 
at: http://inhome.rediff.com/money/2004/may/28spec.htm. 
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microloan securitization of 42.6 billion US dollar was made between SKS and ICICI Bank1. These capital 
injections fueled its portfolio growth. In July 2010, its IPO went forward in Mumbai Stock Exchange with 
approximately 1.5 billion US dollar, an over subscription of more than 13 times; the company valued at nearly 
40 times of its 2010 earnings (Mader, 2013). This IPO raised US $ 358 million rising stock price for over 
following six weeks2. 
However, the controversy to this IPO arose when the Seattle based NGO unit announced to sale all its shares in 
SKS for 70-80 million US dollar to exit its microfinance investment (Rajshekhar & Grenny, 2010; Mader, 2013) 
to earn profit from IPO. The director (Mr. Akula) sold his 13 million US dollar worth private shares to a hedge 
fund in Singapore that fueled this controversy and it reinforced accusation of ‘personal enrichment at the 
expense of poor women’ (Wichtrich, 2012). Arunachalam’s (2011) examination of SKS Balance Sheet found 
that Mr. Akula owned these shares by borrowing roughly 350,000 US dollar from SKS to buy at 10 Rupees per 
share, a discount of nearly 99% against the IPO price. It raised ethical question whether commercialized MFI is a 
club of rich investors seeking to ‘cash in’ on poor borrowers making them poorer and over-indebted. 
 
4. Commercialization of MFIs and Over-indebtedness  
4. 1. Commercialization of MFIs: Extent of Conviction 
The neo-liberal reform (Bateman, 2010) in the economy opened the door to transform NGO type MFIs into 
‘profit seeking’, MFIs driven by commercial funding as their main sources of capital (Wichterich, 2012; Taylor, 
2011). This has driven the influx of commercial investment in MFIs (Taylor, 2011). Again it influenced some of 
the MFIs to change their funding pattern from ‘loan for investment’ to ‘share capital for investment’ by entering 
into formal capital market (Taylor, 2011; Mader, 2013). Critics argue that it translated into deluge of funds for 
investment in MFIs, caused huge market penetration, market saturation, multiple lending and over lending, and 
as a result, over-indebting their clients. This section outlines whether commercialization of microfinance is 
responsible for their clients’ over-indebtedness and if so, to what extent and in what way it is responsible.  
Deluge of capital induced irrational growth, market saturation and competition: At the pinnacle of the factors 
responsible for the crisis was the exponential and irrational growth of loan portfolio due to huge commercial 
fund injection in these MFIs. By March 2010, 35.9% of all households in Andhra Pradesh had MFI loan (Mader, 
2013). To re-lend this capital, MFIs used every possible angle in the client acquisition process (Arunachalam, 
2011). The average loan balance per borrower was more than doubled and compounded by multiple lending 
(Mader, 2013). It result indebting of 82% of the rural households in the region (Wichterich, 2012). 
Commercialization of microfinance in this area caused competition and the market became saturated. Despite the 
default rate increased, MFIs have hide it by ‘rolling over’3, the loans replacing the non-performing loans by 
rescheduling it (Mader, 2013).  
It caused their clients multiple borrowing and loan juggling (i.e. using new loan to pay back the old debt) (Mader, 
2013; Taylor, 2011; Wichterich, 2012; Rhyne, 2001; Burki, 2009). In Andhra Pradesh, it caused growth of loan 
portfolio of between 64% and 98% each year (Mader, 2013). About 84% of the households obtained two or more 
loans while 58% even had four or more loans (Johnson and Meka, 2010). It result 1.5 loans per household in the 
whole state of Andhra Pradesh (Srinivasan, 2010).  
This situation is not only in AP. In Morocco, 10 reporting MFIs reporting in MIX Market also experienced the 
same situation. There was 110% growth of loan portfolio with the highest 330% by the fastest growing MFI, 
ARDI in the 2006-07 crises (Schicks, 2013). This situation is also true in some other developing countries such 
as Bolivia and Mexico for creating their clients over-indebted (Rhyne, 2001; Carrillo, 2009; Gonzalez, 2008). 
Coercion and home made inefficiency: Home made inefficiency of MFIs (Chowdri, 2011) and quantity based 
incentive mechanism to loan officers and agents to inflate their loan portfolio resulted in greater market 
penetration and loss of credit discipline. They started client poaching, snatching customers from each other, and 
even encouraged very poor households to borrow without considering repayment capacities (Wichterich, 2012; 
Burki, 2009). It was almost impossible for an agent to ‘know customers’ due to dealing with around 500 
customers on average (MIX Market database). This loss of credit discipline (Chen et al, 2010) put their clients 
into debt trap (Sriram, 2010).  
This situation is true not only in Andhra Pradesh, but also in some other countries like Pakistan (Burki, 2009) 
                                                           
1India Microfinance (2009), SKS Microfinance and ICICI bank conclude securitization deal. India Microfinance Business 
News, February 19, 2009. Available at: http://indiamicrofinance.com/sks-microfinance-icici-bank-conclude-securitisation-
deal.html.  
2  The Economic Times, August 17, 2010 SKS Microfinance debuts at 11% premium. Available 
at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-08-17/news/27599524_1_sks-shares-listing-gains-sks-microfinance. 
3 David R. 2010. Threat of microfinance defaults rise in India as SKS plans IPO. Bloomberg, New York City, June 14, 2010. 
Available at:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010–06–14/india-microfinance-evokes-risk-of-subprime-in-the-east-as-sks-
prepares-ipo.html. 
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and Bolivia (Rhyne, 2001). Moreover, SKS offered attractive salaries and incentives to their staffs working at the 
village and semi-urban areas than that of their peers (Mader, 2013). This lucrative incentive mechanism 
influenced them to collect as many clients as possible causing to take multiple loans by same client. 
Exorbitant interest rate: Commercial MFIs charge usurious interest rate to poor clients to ensure their profits at 
the expense of putting their clients into debt trap. Although researchers argue that microfinance borrowers earn 
super-normal profit than that of a corporation to repay their loan with all charges, they always cannot earn 
sufficient profit (return) to repay their loans. An ethnographic analysis from Bolivia by Brett (2006) reveals that 
most micro-enterprises in their local context do not earn sufficient profit to repay their loans. 
Compartamo’s interest rate is around 100%; and without VAT (value added tax) it stands to 86% per annum 
(Rhyne and Guimon, 2007). This rate ensures its high profit that helps to attract commercial funds. Astha (2009) 
shows that effective annual rate (EAR) of Compartamos reached to 119%. The Andhra Pradesh MFIs also 
earned above 60% annual effective rate but they disclosed only 24%-28% annual rate (nominal rate) in public 
(Mader, 2013). 
The above discussion and the diagnosis of Andhra Pradesh incidence make it clear that commercialization can be 
a catalyst in over-indebting their clients, not directly responsible for over-indebtedness. The main cause was their 
greedy mentality following some unethical practices to support their irrational and unhealthy growth targets 
where commercialization was the catalyst.  
4. 2. Other Factors behind Over-indebtedness 
We cannot convict commercialization alone responsible for the microfinance players to initiate and expedite 
unethical practices. Some other factors are also responsible for over-indebtedness. However, some of these 
factors are also influenced by commercialization. 
State of the agrarian economy: The majority of the poor people in India are dependent on agriculture. But 
agriculture is vulnerable to climatic conditions such as droughts, rainfall and floods etc. The agricultural 
smallholders in recent years have shifted towards cultivating cash crops (non food grain items) such as ground 
nuts, cotton and used hybrid seeds (Rao and Suri, 2006; Garikipati, 2008; Vasavi, 2010, Taylor, 2011). High 
input prices, fluctuation in market price and production fluctuations (drop in production) due to droughts in this 
semi-arid region in the last few years aggravated their situations; they have taken more loans, again invested it in 
agriculture without realizing any substantial returns (Taylor, 2011; Galab et al, 2009). This irregular cycle of 
agrarian cash flows spurred debt traps in the absences of alternative income generating activities (Garikipati, 
2008 & 2009). 
India’s long tradition of debt dependency: According to Malcolm Darling (1925, stated by Taylor, 2011), the 
Indian peasants are born in debt, live in debt and die in debt. Surprisingly, this statement is true to smallholders 
and landless laborers when there is around 250,000 suicidal death from 1995 to 20101 (Sainath, 2010; Taylor, 
2011). According to Taylor (2011), Galab et al (2009) and Sainath (2010)2, the Andhra Pradesh is in the leading 
state of suicidal incidence with 1,098 farmers from May 2004 to November 2005 and it peaked at 2,414 deaths in 
2009. 
The land-poor farmers and landless laborers are the largest social classes in agrarian India, and they have 
experienced increased insecurity in their ability to meet household needs (Rao and Suri, 2006). Changes in 
agricultural pattern have greatly amplified their insecurity due to changing crop prices; exploitative contracts for 
land rent and inputs, unpredictable climatic condition and quality of off farm activities put them into risky 
position (Jodha, 2008; Breman, 2007; Harris-White, 2008; Taylor, 2011). A number of such overlapping 
processes escalate pressure on marginal cultivators and landless laborers to put them into debt traps. 
Commercialization of microfinance in this case, thereby, fueled to renew the cycle of indebtedness. But the 
fundamental cause of the crisis lies with India’s historical tradition of abusing debt (Taylor, 2011). 
Inappropriate product design:  The product design itself without considering clients’ ability to repay (Schicks, 
2013) and ability to generate cash flow is another problem that fueled the crisis. In the Indian agrarian economy, 
the repayment starts immediately after loan disbursement and installments are frequent throughout the whole 
loan tenure irrespective of the farmers’ harvest time to realize cash. This income seasonality caused further 
borrowing from informal sources (Taylor, 2011; Gokhle, 2009). 
Again, credit to women only makes another problem of grabbing it by their husbands in these male dominated 
societies. It put these women at risk of over-indebtedness as they lost their control on debt use (Brett, 2006; 
Rahman, 1999; Schicks, 2013).  
Absence of Savings Mechanism: Credit only approach is not panacea for clients. State regulation in some 
countries does not authorize savings (Mader, 2013; Taylor, 2011). This is true in Bolivian and Mexican case also. 
In the absence of savings, MFIs lost their low cost source of funds on the one hand, and, borrowers lost their 
                                                           
1 Sainath, P. 2010. Of Luxury Cars and Lowly Tractors. The Hindu, 27 December. 
2 Sainath, P. 2010. 17,368 Farm Suicides in 2009. The Hindu, 27 December. 
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opportunities to consumption smoothing, meeting emergency needs and pay big sum expenditures on the other 
hand (Collins et al, 2009). It causes the borrowers to cope with shocks and increase dependency on debt, hence 
lost their opportunity to self discipline (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). MFIs also lost their opportunity to use 
savings as collateral (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). 
Unproductive credit use: Within Andhra Pradesh, microloan usage was mainly for consumption smoothing, 
covering health related expenditures, costs of wedding, dowries and other social events (Rao, 2005; Samal, 2006; 
Taylor, 2011; Ramachandran et al, 2010). Only a quarter of the loans were used for productive purpose 
particularly for agricultural inputs and one fifth was used to repay the old debt (Srinivasan, 2010; Taylor, 2011). 
This pattern varies greatly according to socio-economic classes and castes. The low caste groups mostly use 
credit for meeting their basic consumption needs or paying existing debts (Taylor, 2011). This use of loan to 
smooth consumption1 (Rhyne, 2001; Bateman, 2010) may temporarily overcome external shocks (Rosenberg, 
2010), but do not help in generating return and alleviating poverty rather than putting them into ‘debt trap’. 
Informal borrowing: Moreover, households’ borrowing from a variety of formal and informal sources2 worsened 
the situation. In Southern India including Andhra Pradesh, some rich and upper castes obtained loan from banks 
and MFIs, lend it to poor households at easy conditions but higher interest rate, and it fueled in multiple 
borrowing and debt trap (Taylor, 2011; Mader, 2013). It cause debt bondage and attached labor (Guerine et al, 
2009a; Mader, 2013). Particularly to agricultural workers and marginal farmers in semi-arid India, it is common 
when production falls and cannot recover the costs of cultivation (Gorikipati, 2009; Olsen and Ramanamurphy, 
2000).  
State intervention and SHG program: The design of state sponsored SHG program also fueled in this race. 
Srinivasan (2010) estimated that the total number of microfinance clients in Andhra Pradesh was 25.36 million 
of whom SHG program alone accounts for 19.11 million clients. It caused market saturation, taking multiple 
loans to cover repayment schedules and overlapping of about 10% between MFIs and SHGs (Taylor, 2011). 
Moreover some MFIs claim that AP government intervention acted as enabling factor in the crisis (Mader, 2013). 
Rao (2008) mentioned SHG program in this battle to monopolize the poor. 
Staff and group pressure to committing suicide: To recover the default loan, sometimes the field officers and 
agents influenced and pressed clients to commit suicide to recover the loan due from credit life insurance (Mader, 
2013). On the other hand, MFI staffs also claimed that group members influenced the over-indebted client to 
commit suicide to avoid group repayment of the defaulted loan.  
However, a subsequent investigation by Ashta et al (2011) across different states of India found positive but 
insignificant correlation between microfinance penetration and suicidal cases. However, it found stronger and 
significant correlation between SHG penetration and suicidal cases. Moreover, in all the states, it found positive 
association of microfinance penetration with male suicides, not female suicides; but majority of microfinance 
clients are female. It indicates that rather than microfinance, agricultural production fluctuation and other 
household uncertainties are mainly responsible in their suicides. 
 
5. Consequences of over indebtedness 
Though commercialization of MFIs allows entering into large pool of funds to support their portfolio growth, it 
is a great concern for management from risk management and customer protection perspective when it increases 
the probability of their clients’ over-indebtedness. Over-indebtedness is a threat to profitability and sustainability 
of MFIs when it results delinquency and deterioration of portfolio quality. Chen et al. (2010) found that over-
indebtedness increase portfolio at risk (PaR) around 7% in Bosnia, 12% in Nicaragua, 10% in Morocco and 13% 
in Pakistan. It requires higher loan loss provisions (Schicks, 2013), and then write-off finally causes permanent 
loss of portfolio. Other consequences are higher screening, collection and operating costs in dealing with over-
indebted customers (Canner and Luckett, 1991). Collection of default debt challenges organizational identity, it 
causes shrinking their operations and results in portfolio losses and retrenchment; loan officers and other 
employees may loss their job, cause lower staff morale, and make bad impression on good borrowers. It weakens 
MFIs, put them at risk, create instability, and put their other operations and even savings at risk (Schicks, 2013; 
Burton, 2008). The crisis in Andhra Pradesh and Bolivia is the evidence of this situation (Rhyne, 2001; Gonzalez, 
2008; Wichterich, 2012; Mader, 2013). In Andhra Pradesh, the overall loan portfolio shrunk from US $ 5.4 
billion in 2010 to US $ 4.3 billion in 2011 with decline in number of clients borrowing from 32.5 million to 26.4 
million (Mader, 2013).  
Over-indebtedness, in this case, not only harms the poor clients, but also causes the investors to lose confidence 
in MFIs when the MFIs make losses, crunch their liquidity, and suffers negative growth. It makes difficulties for 
the MFIs to find new capital and their share prices in the market fall. So, it not only cause problem to these 
                                                           
1 This case is also true for Bolivian crisis (1999-2000). 
2 Village money lenders played a big role in this case. 
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troubled MFIs, but also spillover in another MFIs, put the whole industry in question (Gonzalez, 2008; 
Wichterich, 2012; Mader, 2013; Schicks, 2013). Over-indebtedness in these problem MFIs put their public 
reputation in question, accuse political interference, media criticism and ultimately government may take drastic 
action against MFIs to restrictive regulation. In Andhra Pradesh, government closed some MFI branches for this 
allegation (Taylor, 2011; Mader, 2013).  
Over-indebtedness also worsens borrowers’ socio-economic and psychological situations rather than improving 
their living condition from debt use. Guerin et al. (2009a) treated microfinance as the ‘double edged sword’; it 
can either reduce financial vulnerability or push the households further into debt. It contradicts social mission of 
microfinance, exacerbate poverty level of borrowers, threaten their social and economic position, and push them 
into mental and psychological disorders (Schicks, 2013). It causes borrowers to reduce their consumption, sale of 
income generating assets, stop their children from school (Schicks, 2013). The extreme form of this evil act is 
bonded labor or slavery1, suicide2, sexual harassment and prostitution when they fail to repay the loan in due 
time (Churchill and Guerin, 2004; Picherit, 2009). It may threaten MFI sustainability by triggering delinquency 
and default (Burki, 2009; Rhyne, 2001; Schicks, 2013). Finally it causes ‘mission drift’. Management need to 
acknowledge it in due time and need to take proper action before occurring ‘disaster’. 
 
6. Recommendations, Policy Implications and Limitations 
6. 1. Recommendations & Policy Implications 
However, the allegation of over-indebting poor clients, partly fueled by commercialization, are need to control or 
eliminate to ensure dual mission, sound and healthy operation and fair competition that can benefit both the 
MFIs and their poor clients. At the core of the crisis, the following three areas of actions are necessary to 
implement so that it may not happen again in the future. 
6. 1. 1. For the MFIs: Industry self regulation 
Self regulation of microfinance industry is very important in an informal economy especially in countries with 
limited state regulation and supervision (McKee et al, 2011). This is possible in different dimensions that are 
discussed below.  
a. Follow client protection principles: Client protection principles, introduced by Smart Campaign, are 
important to implement to enhance credibility of MFIs in providing financial services to the poor 
(Arguello et al, 2013; Ghate, 2007a). The most important principles to eliminate any coercive action 
and to overcome the crisis are: 
i) Develop an appropriate product design and delivery mechanism so that clients do not need to 
sacrifice in repayment on the one hand and meet their funding needs on the other hand. 
Determination of appropriate amount of credit, flexible and suitable installment system matching 
with their cash flows, option of both group and individual loan, repayment options convenient with 
their capacities are important to consider in this case. 
ii) Ensure Responsible pricing such as interest, commissions and fees charged to their clients are 
important both from MFI sustainability, and social and ethical viewpoint (Arguello et al, 2013). 
Rather than charging high margin in fixing interest rate3 to pay interests and dividends to investors 
and shareholders, controlling operating costs by increasing their efficiency in operation help the 
MFIs to protect their poor clients from over-indebtedness.  
iii) Maintain transparency and disclose price related information to ensure that borrowers are well 
informed about loan amount, installments, fees, charges, repayment systems and loan durations that 
can eliminate coercive actions, and facilitate clients’ informed decisions. Clearly inform the 
effective annual rate (EAR) and APR, and penalty to be charged in failure to repay in due time 
(Arguello et al, 2013). MFIs can disclose it in a big poster or screen so that everyone can see, 
understand and aware of it4. 
iv) Fair and respectful client treatment / code of conduct: The Bolivia and Andhra Pradesh crisis 
blamed that MFI agents and loan officers have not respected their clients’ ability to repay the loan. 
Building strong relationship with clients, understanding their situations, developing mutual trust, 
exploring and implementing repayment options and agreeing on solutions can redress client 
grievance, solve conflict and help to recover loan overdue (McKee et al, 2011) than harassment and 
pressure to commit suicide. 
                                                           
1 When the borrowers obtain loan from local moneylenders to repay the old loan of MFI at usurious rate, they have to work 
for more for the moneylenders as a condition to repay the loan when they are not able to repay the loan. 
2  Conviction of suicide in Andhra Pradesh, India, please see one story: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-
28/suicides-among-borrowers-in-india-show-how-men-made-a-mess-of-microcredit.html 
3 That not only covers the operating cost, funding cost and loan loss provision but also high net margin.  
4 Compartamos exercise this practice in their every branch. 
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b. Risk management technique: In case of product design, selecting loan application and follow up, it is 
important to follow adequate risk management mechanism. Among them, some important techniques 
are. 
i) Know your customers (KYC): Use due diligence in client screening and assessment of loan 
application. Clients’ repayment capacity, nature of household works or business is needed to 
consider. Close communication and follow up may increase operating cost, but, to a large extent, it 
will reduce over-indebtedness.  
ii) The amount of credit: The amount of credit to be sanctioned will be according to repayment 
capacity of the borrowers. It must not be too low to take multiple loan and not too large for the 
borrower to afford and repay. 
iii) Savings and insurance: savings and insurance (credit life) can act as buffer against repayment 
difficulties; reduce borrowers’ sacrifice to repay. In this case, commitment device with clients’ 
consent can be an effective tool. 
iv) Compliance monitoring and control system: There need an effective compliance monitoring system 
inside the MFIs and field level. Random audit, surprise visit and tracking staff can ensure it (Burki, 
2009).  
v) Set up early warning culture: Managers should periodically and regularly update all client related 
information; particularly in monitoring portfolio at risk (PaR), reserve for loan losses and dropout 
rate that act as the early warning system to take adequate step. 
vi) Productive use of loan: Be sure in productive use of loan by the clients. Consumer loan or use of the 
loan in unproductive purpose worsens their ability to repay as these loans will not generate any 
return. 
c. Avoid aggressive competition and portfolio growth: Rather than illusive growth, MFIs need to ensure 
sustainable growth for its long term survival. Rather than expanding in highly competitive saturated 
market, search for new market/region where poor households actually need financial access and have 
better potential to spread their operations. 
Last, MFIs need to be careful in setting quantity based incentive mechanism by considering portfolio quality and 
practice of code of conduct. A balanced corporate governance mechanism ensuring key stakeholders’ interests 
that address operating and financing mechanisms of MFIs can overcome some of the problems. 
6. 1. 2. For Microfinance Associations, Central Banks, NGO Bureau and Regulators: 
a. Credit information bureau: Establish credit information bureau, introduce real time information sharing 
and update it regularly; ensure that all the MFIs, banks and non-bank financial institutions are using and 
sharing it so that not any client can take multiple loans. Central bank and regulatory or supervisory 
authority can ensure it with the help and co-operation from microfinance associations and donors or 
investors. 
b. Regulation for MFIs: Although it is impossible to cover all the MFIs under same umbrella due to their 
different regulatory status, the state have to be very prudent and careful in forming regulations to ensure 
microfinance best practices, and to remove all unethical practices (de Quidt et al, 2012). 
c. Awareness creation and debt literacy: Introduce debt literacy training and campaign to illiterate poor 
clients through educational video1, and media advertisement to create awareness about the proper use of 
debt and danger of over-indebtedness.  
6. 1. 3. For Investors and Donors: 
Investors and donors have to be careful and responsible in selecting MFIs when there is rapid growth and strong 
competition. The funders need to conduct thorough assessment of the MFIs, their operations, and funding 
proposals with due diligence in the light of client protection principles, management strength, internal control, 
risk management system and practice of good governance in their operations and management (Leader & Wilson, 
2008; Burki, 2009; Gravesteijn et al, 2011). 
6. 2. Limitations 
The above mentioned recommendations and suggestions have some limitations in their implementation. First, it 
is almost impossible for the MFIs to ensure productive use of credit by the clients as per the loan agreement. 
Second, in agrarian economy, when borrowers’ income and cash flows are dependent on several external factors 
that are beyond the control of both parties2, the above recommendations may not work in full extent. Third, in 
some countries, regulation does not permit low cost funding sources such as savings, and hence it is impossible 
to reduce cost of funds to reduce EAR. Fourth, as claimed in Andhra Pradesh, introduction of credit life 
insurance goes in opposite direction when the group members and/ or loan officers force the over-indebted 
                                                           
1 In India Ujjiban do this kind of awareness that is compulsory for every client to see before obtaining loan. 
2 For example, production fluctuations 
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clients to commit suicide to recover the loan form insurance company. Fifth, some borrowers deliberately stop 
repaying, create artificial over-indebtedness, try to politicize and attract media attention and create environment 
for revolt. Last, when some single mission financial institutions1 offer consumer credit using same lending 
methodology of microfinance, it increase competition, cause misunderstanding about microfinance and 
exacerbate the situation that are beyond the control of MFIs. 
Furthermore, implementation of the above mentioned recommendations is not easy. The management of most 
MFIs may not have adequate financial and risk management background. Dynamic appraisal of clients may be 
difficult when the clients require quick disbursement. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper is to study whether commercialization of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is 
responsible for over-indebting their poor borrowers taking into account the Andhra Pradesh crisis. This study 
argues that we cannot avoid commercialization as subsidized credit and donor support may not exist for a long 
time and as investors will not provide funds without financial incentives.  
Critics argue that massive influx of capital from shareholders, commercial banks, and international and private 
investors cause exponential growth of loan portfolios and this result in huge market penetration, market 
saturation, multiple lending, over lending, and finally over-indebting their clients. The diagnosis of Andhra 
Pradesh incidence indicates that commercialization is not solely and directly responsible for over-indebting their 
clients. It is the outcome of internal inefficiencies, unethical and malpractices of MFIs and some external factors 
like production fluctuation and transformation in the agrarian economy in this semi-arid region, and India’s long 
tradition of debt dependency. However, this study found that commercialization is indirectly responsible for 
over-indebtedness when ‘profit seeking’, MFIs have driven by commercial investment. It translated into deluge 
of funds in MFIs, caused huge market penetration, market saturation, and as a result, influenced their 
management and staffs to follow some unethical practices like multiple lending and over lending, that resulted in 
over-indebting their clients.  
Over-indebtedness, in this case, not only harms the poor clients, but also causes the investors to lose confidence 
in MFIs when the MFIs loss hope to earn profit, crunch their liquidity, and experience negative growth. It 
endangers both social and financial missions and the industry sustainability. It makes difficult for the MFIs to 
find new capital; their share prices in the market fall. Moreover, it not only cause problem to these troubled MFIs, 
but also spillover in another MFIs, jeopardize the whole industry (Gonzalez, 2008; Wichterich, 2012; Mader, 
2013; Schicks, 2013). Over-indebtedness in these problem MFIs put their public reputation in question, accuse 
political interference, media criticism and ultimately government may take drastic action against them through 
restrictive regulation.  
Proper measure is necessary to overcome such problem and to protect the MFIs and their clients for survival and 
sustainability of this industry. We should not blame commercialization alone for over indebting microfinance 
clients. MFIs have to be strict in removing all the malpractices and finding the ways for better welfare of their 
clients fulfilling their needs on the one hand and for ensuring sustainable growth of the MFIs on the other hand. 
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